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On the evening of 11 April 2002, the third day of a general strike, the
Venezuelan armed forces rebelled against their president, Hugo Chávez
Frías. Reacting to the bloody outcome of clashes between pro- and anti-
government demonstrators near the presidential palace, the commander of
the Army, General Efraím Vásquez Velasco, announced in a nationally
televised address that he would no longer obey presidential orders. General
Vásquez accused Hugo Chávez of preparing widespread repression of anti-
government strikers and demonstrators and he ordered military units
under his command to disregard further government orders and remain
confined to base. High-ranking generals and admirals soon followed
Vásquez onto the airwaves, expressing their solidarity with his position and
their refusal to support President Chávez. In the early hours of 12 April
2002, the senior military officer in the Venezuelan armed forces, General
Lucas Rincón Romero, announced the resignation of President Chávez and
the formation of a transitional government under the leadership of Pedro
Carmona Estanga, president of the National Federation of Chambers of
Commerce (FEDECAMARAS).1 
Pedro Carmona’s interim government committed a number of key political
errors during its brief existence. First, it was drawn from a narrow right-
wing slice of the political spectrum that excluded key elements of the
opposition to Hugo Chávez, most notably organised labour. Images of the
well-heeled participants in the televised self-proclamation of Pedro
Carmona as president quickly confirmed the sectarian upper class nature of
the new government, particularly to poor and working class Venezuelans
where pro-Chávez sentiments are concentrated. Second, Carmona’s decree
dissolving the National Assembly and the Supreme Court made it clear to
many military officers that the new government was completely
unconstitutional and not prepared to meet even minimum democratic
criteria. Third, Carmona erred in the military arena, appointing as Minister
of Defence an admiral who had very little authority within the officer corps,
rather than a senior Army general. He also selected a recently cashiered
officer, Admiral Molina Tamayo, as head of presidential security. These
165JILAS  Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 8:1, July 2002~
The Reemergence of the Venezuelan
Armed Forces as a Political Actor
Harold A. Trinkunas
Naval Postgraduate School
THE APRIL EVENTS IN VENEZUELA: A FORUM
appointments, which also contravened military views on seniority and
merit, angered a number of senior officers who had initially supported the
Carmona government.2
Less than twenty four hours after becoming the head of a transitional
government, Pedro Carmona was forced to flee the presidential palace to
make way for pro-Chávez civilian and military forces. These swiftly
engineered Hugo Chávez’s return to power, and many of the generals and
admirals who had so recently refused to support his government reversed
their positions, many scrambling to provide explanations for their
behaviour during the rebellion. Amidst the celebrations of his supporters,
Chávez advocated a new policy of national reconciliation, but also ordered
the detention of high-profile military officers associated with the events of
11 April 2002.3
At first glance, what may seem most surprising about the recent turn of
events in Venezuela is the rapid reversal of the coup against President
Chávez, particularly given the continuous political turmoil that
characterised his administration and his growing unpopularity during the
previous year. However, the military rebellion against the democratically-
elected government, the first since 1992 and only the third since 1963, is of
much greater importance, since it signals the final deterioration of civilian
control of the armed forces in Venezuela. Any future democratic
government in Venezuela, whether led by president Chávez or his
successor, will have to contend with the armed forces, which have fully
emerged as political actors in Venezuela after nearly four decades of civilian
rule.
Sources of the crisis in civil-military relations in
Venezuela
Until the 1990s, Venezuela was often seen as a democratic exception in a
region characterised by political unrest, military coups and revolution.
Venezuela’s democratic success rested partly on the ability of its political
leaders to institutionalise civilian control over the armed forces. Unlike
many Western democracies, government control of the military in
Venezuela did not depend on legislative oversight of roles and budgets or a
civilian-led Ministry of Defence. Rather, since the 1960s, Venezuelan
political leaders followed a strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ vis-à-vis the
armed forces, which later became embedded in the very institutions of civil-
military relations. These institutional arrangements were designed to
inhibit cooperation or ‘jointness’ among the Army, Navy and Air Force.
They also drove a wedge between senior officers, whose promotions were
controlled by the Congress and the President, and junior officers whose
careers depended strictly on merit. Moreover, even though political leaders
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paid lip-service to the armed forces’ national security doctrine, which called
for military participation in economic and social development, successive
civilian governments carefully restricted the role of officers and soldiers in
any activity that was not directly related to national defence. The result
were armed forces that found it difficult to cooperate, especially in anything
as risky and ambitious as a coup d’état and were tightly focused on
professional and defence related issues.4 
By the 1980s, the crisis of Venezuela’s state-led development model sparked
political and social consequences that began to affect the armed forces.
Junior officers were increasingly disgusted by the corruption that they
believed pervaded military and political elites and began to conceive of
political alternatives that better reflected their concern for the
underprivileged. As products of a military educational system that
emphasised leadership, self-sacrifice and nationalism over political and
economic reality, the most successful of the conspiratorial groups,
Movimiento Bolivariano 200, rejected the possibility of change within
Venezuela’s democratic framework and began to organise a coup d’état.
Lulled into complacency by the prolonged political quiescence of the armed
forces, civilian and military elites ignored the growing evidence of military
conspiracy under the leadership of a highly regarded Army officer, Hugo
Chávez Frías.
In part, the neoliberal economic policies of the second government of Carlos
Andrés Pérez provided a pretext for the 1992 coups. Shortly after his
inauguration in 1989, widespread rioting and looting shook many
Venezuelan cities. Military units were called in to restore order, resulting in
hundreds of civilian casualties and many of the junior officers who led these
troops were appalled by the bloodletting. The highly negative impact of the
Pérez administration’s economic policies on military salaries and benefits
were keenly felt by many officers, further sowing unrest within the armed
forces. In this fertile ground, Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez was able to organise
a coup against the government in February 1992. Consisting entirely of
Army units, the coup failed in the face of resistance by the other branches of
the armed forces. Similarly, an Air Force coup in November 1992, led by
officers sympathetic to Chávez’s message, failed due to a lack of support
within the Army. The institutions of civilian control of the armed forces
remained strong enough in the 1990s to make a successful coup d’état very
difficult, but even an unsuccessful military rebellion tipped Venezuela’s
democracy into crisis.5
Although President Carlos Andrés Pérez survived the events of 1992, the
coups sparked increasing political and social protest against his
administration and his policies, and he was eventually impeached by the
Congress for misuse of government funds. The 1992 coups also set off a
wave of conspiracy and unrest within the armed forces as some officers took
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sides for and against Hugo Chávez, even though the great majority
maintained a professional detachment from politics. President Rafael
Caldera, elected in 1993, restored a measure of unity within the armed
forces by purging both Chávez’s supporters and his right-wing opponents
from the officer corps. However, the ghosts of these divisions remained in
the officer corps and would regain their vigour in the future.6
Hugo Chávez and the collapse of civilian control of the
armed forces in Venezuela.
Having failed to achieve power by military means, Hugo Chávez succeeded
brilliantly in the political realm. Despite beginning his campaign with
single-digit poll ratings at the beginning of 1998, he swept the December
presidential vote with one of the highest approval ratings in Venezuela’s
democratic history. One of the planks of his left of centre political platform
was reform of civil-military relations to correct what he perceived as the
perverse aspects of this system under his predecessors. When his reform
programme was implemented, rather than modernising civilian control of
the military, President Chávez’s reforms dismantled it, substituting
personalised control of the armed forces for the previous institutional
arrangements.
The Chávez military reforms initially focused on three aspects: loosening
the constitutional and legal constraints on political activities by the armed
forces; expanding their role in social and economic development activities;
and removing legislative influence over military promotions. As part of the
reform of Venezuela’s constitution, the Constituent Assembly deleted
language barring military deliberation on political issues and granted
active-duty members of the armed forces the right to vote, which had been
withheld under the 1961 constitution. The role of the armed forces in
development activities also greatly expanded under the President’s Plan
Bolívar 2000, which channeled large amounts of social welfare funding
away from civilian agencies and towards the military garrisons in each
Venezuelan state. As a result, the armed forces became involved in
infrastructure construction, repairing schools and hospitals, and even the
sale of consumer goods at cut-rate prices in popular markets in an attempt
to hold down inflation. President Chávez also relied on hundreds of military
officers seconded to positions in the public administration to enforce his
authority over the state bureaucracy, which he perceived as having been
colonised by his political opponents during the previous four decades of
civilian rule. Finally, Chávez took control of military promotions, alleging
that the legislature’s role in this process during the previous four decades
had politicised it. 
Although some aspects of these reforms proved popular with the officer
168
JILAS  Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 8:1, July 2002~
corps, the overall impact on civilian control of the armed forces was
negative. The extension of suffrage to the armed forces was appreciated by
the officer corps and helped to solidify initial support for Chávez in the
military. Similarly, some officers, particularly in the Army, genuinely
appreciated the new opportunities to contribute to Venezuela’s development
through participation in the Plan Bolívar 2000 and public administration.
On the other hand, expanded social welfare roles for the armed forces also
created new opportunities for corruption by some in the military. To the
chagrin of more honest officers, charges of corruption involving the armed
forces became daily fare for the media. In addition, military officers in the
public administration had important roles in shaping public policy and, as a
result, they became de facto political actors. Finally, President Chávez used
his control of promotions to reshape the officer corps, favouring officers who
supported his political agenda with plum commands and assignments.
Numerous generals and admirals, many of whom had opposed the 1992
coup attempts, were shunted into administrative duties, retired or were
placed on leave. Naturally, this generated discontent and opposition among
military officers excluded from the president’s favour and increased the
politicisation of military promotions. Taken in their totality, the Chávez
reform of the armed forces undermined a number of the traditional
elements of civilian control in Venezuela.7 In the absence of
institutionalised control of the armed forces, President Chávez could only
rely on personalised mechanisms to maintain the loyalty of the officer corps.
As the events of 11−14 April demonstrated, this is a weak reed on which to
rest the stability of a democratic government. 
Implications for Venezuelan civil-military relations
In the aftermath of the 11−14 April events, the Venezuelan armed forces
are split into three factions: anti- and pro-Chávez minorities and an
institutionalist majority. The anti-Chávez faction, concentrated among
senior officers, has been hard hit by its defeat during the rebellion. Its
association with the Carmona government is likely to have discredited them
among their subordinates, and the Chávez administration has begun
prosecutions. Military prosecutors have detained 58 officers, 24 of whom are
generals or admirals. In the Army, these detentions have largely occurred
in the logistics and aviation branches. However, in what may be a sign of
uncertainty, the Chávez administration has been handling these officers
with kid gloves, allowing many of them to remain under house arrest rather
than in military prisons. Pro-Chávez forces have emerged from the rebellion
with a mixed record. Senior officers closely identified with the President’s
programme, such as General Rosendo, the commander of the armed forces’
unified command (CUFAN), sided with the rebels on 11 April.8 As a result,
almost the entire military high command was replaced in the days following
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President Chávez’s return to power. However, junior officers in general, and
some senior officers in particular, notably General Baduell of the 42nd
Paratrooper Brigade, have demonstrated that they are committed
supporters of President Chávez and the constitutional regime. Five
relatively junior generals, led by General Baduell, have temporarily
constituted themselves as a parallel military high command to support
President Chávez in the event of any new military upheaval. Finally, the
institutionalist majority in the Venezuelan armed forces emerges in a
somewhat stronger position politically, although one which is also more
threatening for the Chávez administration in the long run. By deposing the
president in the first place, it has shown that it is willing to place limits on
the actions of the President, preventing him from using force to achieve his
political objectives. However, its support for democratic principles and the
constitution also shows that the Venezuelan armed forces are not willing to
support an outright dictatorship, which is likely to enhance their image.9
The credibility of the civilian opposition to President Chávez has been
undermined by its anti-democratic actions during the 11−14 April period
and this will have a negative impact on its future relations with the
military. The hijacking of the transitional government by the most
conservative elements in Venezuelan civil society, their mistakes in
handling civil-military relations, and the subsequent failure of the coup, can
only create doubts within the officer corps about the wisdom of working
with the opposition. More importantly, the unconstitutional decrees of the
Carmona government confirmed for many officers the truth of President
Chávez’s claims about the opposition, namely, that it is led by a right-wing
conspiracy between a corrupt oligarchy and the owners of the media. This
charge will especially resonate among junior and mid-ranking officers most
likely to favour President Chávez and, more significantly, most likely to
lead combat units. As a result, important elements of the armed forces will
distance themselves from those civilians who oppose the president.
The Chávez administration remains weakened by the military rebellion,
and the armed forces are well placed to emerge as an important political
actor in Venezuelan politics. In the past three years, President Chávez has
repeatedly asserted the solidarity of the armed forces with his revolutionary
project as one of the strengths of his regime, asserting that the guns of the
military were on the side of the people (and by extension his programmes).
This claim of a seamless connection between military support and
government authority is no longer credible. Moreover, as critics of his
military policy predicted, his efforts to manipulate the officer promotion
process to favour his revolutionary project accentuated splits in the armed
forces. While he did have sufficient supporters in key positions as a result of
this policy, President Chávez’s personal control of the armed forces was not
enough to prevent a nearly successful military rebellion. The small number
of rebellious officers who have actually been detained and the somewhat
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larger number of generals who have been placed on administrative leave,
confirm that the administration is not secure in its relations with the armed
forces.10 In the future, President Chávez will constantly have to gauge the
support of the officer corps for his government. More importantly,
Venezuelan society will increasingly look to the military for answers to the
ongoing political crisis. Whether the institutionalist majority in the officer
corps likes it or not, the armed forces have become an independent political
actor in Venezuela. Given these circumstances, there is no longer civilian
control of the armed forces, and democracy in Venezuela is no longer
secure.11
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